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The slow path of reform before the fall
of the Santer Commission
The European Commission is an administratively well-
established organisation, starting as it did in 1957 with
the involvement of just six Member States and now
looking towards its fifth accession wave in May 2004,
which will take it to 25 Member States. Unlike most
domestic administrations the Commission has grown
massively both in terms of size and responsibilities over
the past five decades. The volume of financial trans-
actions in which the Commission has been involved, for
example, increased from a few thousand per year in the
1960s, to 60,000 by the late 1980s, to 620,000 by the
late 1990s, and now easily surpasses 1,000,000 transac-
tions per year. However, despite the scale of change, the
Commission’s organisational systems underwent very
few changes over the years, and human resource policies,
developed in the 1950s and 1960s for a much smaller
institution, hardly altered.
The early period of the Commission was characte-
rised by a tight, centralised administration under the
strong leadership of Secretary General Emile Noël. Mr
Noël began his three-decade reign with just 3,000 staff
(a fraction of today’s level), highly motivated individuals
driven by a certain genius idealism required to establish
the fledgling operation. The human resources system
was based largely on the French civil service system,
which required high entry standards and then conducted
career progression on the basis of seniority.
The growth of the administration continued relatively
unevaluated until 1979 and the publication of the
Spierenburg Report, the first major review of the internal
workings of the Commission. Ambassador Spierenburg
was asked by the Jenkins Commission to lead a team of
independent experts studying the organisational
structure, activities and employment resources of the
Commission. The report recommended streamlining
the organisation, identifying the lack of a management
culture and little merit-motivation as causes for concern.
The subsequent changes focussed on reform of DG
structures, portfolios and organogrammes rather than on
radical changes to the human resources regime.
Commissioner Henning Christophersen**, in his role as
Vice President for Personnel and Administration,
attempted a structural modernisation programme in
1985, but this too failed to have a fundamental impact.
It was not until the Santer Commission that reform
was again given its appropriate prominence, with the
publication of ‘Tomorrow’s Commission’ in April 1998.
This established the Sound and Efficient Management
2000 (SEM) reforms (first launched in 1995) and the
Modernisation of Administration and Personnel Policy
2000 (MAP) as the financial management and personnel
lynchpins for radical administrative reform. Most rele-
vant was part III of the report ‘What role for Commission
officials?’which paved the way for a genuine discussion
on the Staff Regulations. For the first time the link
between the Commission’s tasks and resources available
was thoroughly analysed. Rather than focussing simply
on the modernisation of structures, the Commission
sought to evaluate the management skills possessed by
its workforce, and ultimately address the alteration of
the career structure along merit lines.
Those making the first, tentative and sensitive steps
towards a possible reform of the Staff Regulations, such
as Commissioner Liikanen, were nearly blown off course
by the leaking of the confidential Caston Report and its
subsequent publication by the Commission in April
1998. The suggestions that the career structure should
be simplified to reduce the four existing staff categories
to two and to the introduction of the merit principle were
poorly received by staff unions. The inevitable conse-
quence of the mis-communication and apparent secrecy
was a well-attended strike later that month. In an attempt
to bring staff on board the Director General, David
Williamson, was tasked with consulting widely with
staff and unions on the way forward through his ‘Reflec-
tion Group on Personnel Policy’. The Williamson Report,
published in November 1998, still did not rule out the
possibility that the Staff Regulations could be amended,
although the bulk of the suggestions focussed on reform
that could be internally executed, such as greater training
and more concours. One official summed up his approach
as “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it”; however, his fresh view
was widely appreciated. Complementing this spirit of
openness on reform, the Commission made efforts to
publicise a ‘screening’ procedure known by its French
acronym DECODE, or ‘Designing Tomorrow’s Com-
mission,’ to take stock of the operation of all its DGs and
Services (which later reported in May 1999).
The new landscape of reform following the fall
of the Santer Commission
A momentum of positive dialogue on reform was
beginning to build, with the recognition from all sides
(staff, Commissioners, the Council and unions) that
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there was a need for a modernisation of the Commission’s
human resources policy. However, the landscape
changed entirely with the European Parliament’s
decision in December 1998 not to discharge the 1996
budget, calling for a Committee of Independent Experts
(CIE) to look into various infamous allegations against
the Commission – now widely known by the catch-all
phrase ‘the Cresson affair’. With the publication of the
‘First Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismana-
gement and Nepotism in the European Commission’
from the Committee of Independent Experts on 15th
March 1999 the death knell of the Santer Commission
sounded and the Commission fell. A caretaker Commis-
sion sat in place until the autumn, at which time the
CIE’s second report was published. Not only did the
report conclude that there was a “displacement of respon-
sibility” with regard to the ex-ante controls and internal
audit function within DGs, it also recommended a deep
modernisation of staffing policy, including the formal
introduction of the merit principle.
The new Commission wasted no time in seizing the
opportunity and embracing the mandate. Just four days
after the publication of the second CIE report, on 14th
September 1999, a ‘Task Force for Administrative
Reform’ was entrusted with generating the policy
building blocks of a proposed White Paper on reform.
Soon after, on 16th November, the Commission adopted
what it called a number of ‘Strategic Orientations’ for
reform, and then published its ‘Strategic Options Paper’
on reform the next month. Vice President Kinnock, now
Commissioner for Administration and Reform under the
new Commission, proposed a three-pronged strategy for
reform. It would cover: i) prioritisation and allocation of
resources; ii) audit financial management and control;
and iii) human resources. Priority setting included the
sensible introduction of modern Activity Based Budge-
ting (ABB) and a review of where the Commission could
best externalise its activities and where it should concen-
trate resources on core tasks. The aims of the reform of
Audit, Management and Control were to protect the
financial interests of the Union, for example, by over-
hauling internal audit practices and improving financial
control by clearly defining responsibilities of authorising
officers and line managers. These are both substantial
elements of the ongoing reform and, in the light of the
Eurostat affair, remain high profile. This article focuses
on the third dimension – the reform of human resources.
Here the aims were to ensure: that the Commission
builds an appropriately trained workforce; that career
development becomes based on merit; and that the
rights and obligations of staff are clear and the business
reflects the modern social and ethical context in which
it is conducted. These considerations would, it was
suggested, require changes to the Staff Regulations.
Once these principles were established the ball of
far-reaching reform was set in motion. A consultative
document was adopted the following January, and the
College adopted the White Paper on 1st March 2000,
only around six months after the new Commission its
task force had been set to work. The human resources
elements of reform were now clearly spelt out, and topics
covered in detail ranged from revised discipline and
whistle-blowing procedures to a more linear career
structure. Consultation with other Institutions such as
the Council and Parliament (so far four Parliamentary
reports have been devoted to the subject) followed, and
the Commission set about gathering best practice
examples from other organisations and Member States.
The next step came with the drafting of the consultation
paper, published in October 2000. The Commission
then proceeded to undertake a massive round of consul-
tations with staff and unions – a communication effort
never before witnessed in the Commission. In February
2001 the Commission adopted a series of decisions on
human resources policy that did not require the consent
of other Institutions, and this led to the later submission
to Council under the Spanish Presidency of the proposal
to amend the Staff Regulations in April 2002. The
Commission has since reached a crucial stage in the
amendment of the Staff Regulations with political
agreement on the proposed package of reform being
reached at the General Affairs Council in May 2003.
This political agreement was proceeded by relatively
poorly attended industrial action as the unions attempted
to lobby both the Council and the Commission on the
package being proposed.
It is from this point – following political agreement
and prior to the envisaged entering into force of the new
Regulations on1st May 2004 – that we in this paper will
consider the possible impacts of the reform of the Staff
Regulations.
The Impact of Reform: Career deal, pay,
promotion & appraisal
At the heart of “the reform” lies the modernisation of
human resources towards a performance-based career
system – the simple notion that advancement, reward
and respect stem firstly from proven merit and not just
seniority or experience. Acceptance of this concept,
particularly its implications for clear and objective
appraisal, represents a significant modernising shift for
the Commission.
It is worth noting that many of the benefits of the new
career system could have been accessed under the original
statut, and reform of the staff regulations was not therefore
explicitly necessary. But Kinnock’s team were keen for
the Commission to demonstrate its ambition. For them,
it was not just about changing the legal mechanics, it
was about cultural change and to deliver that would
require the radical break of a new statut.
A linear Career structure – of sorts
The original career system was introduced in 1962 and
reflected what was then the traditional civil service structure
in many Member States, a structure which itself had dated back
for centuries. It divided staff into four categories (A to D), each
with up to eight grades. Each grade had eight steps, and
automatically officials moved up one step (with an
accompanying salary increase) every two years.
A typical fault of this system was that staff would
4 Eipascope 2003/3 http://www.eipa.nl
often face career bottlenecks. The tendency was for
officials to reach the highest grade they could reasonably
expect to achieve (A4, B1, C1 or D1) at around 50 years
of age, assuming they did not join the European Civil
Service very late in their careers. After that they could
look forward to an automatic increase in step every two
years over a maximum of sixteen years. With promotion
improbable and an automatic system of rewards effec-
tively regardless of performance, the organisation failed
to provide these staff with the right incentives to ensure
they remained motivated.
A related problem of this rigid career structure was
that it was very difficult to move between categories –
an official was often effectively branded as say a C grade
on entry and that was that. A culture with parallels, as one
senior official put it, to the Grandes Academies, which
relied on ensuring that recruitment deliberately selected
the best, and the need for monitoring and measurement
of performance was deemed either inefficient, ineffective
or unnecessary1. Yet in an age of life-long learning and
where the investment in and development of staff is not
just expected it is demanded such a rigid structure
appears outdated. Moreover, the advance of IT has made
the traditional categories C and D largely superfluous
and, the Commission itself argues, “today’s staff in these
categories are much more highly qualified than their
predecessors were 30 years ago”2.
So a new, more continuous, career structure was
designed, based on two basic categories: administrator
(“AD”) equivalent to the old A grade, and assistant
(“AST”) replacing categories B and C; category D
would be phased out. Alongside the categories is a linear
grading system for all staff ranging from one to sixteen.
Assistants can be at grades 1-11 and administrators
grades 5-16. With less steps in each grade and faster
mean progress anticipated through the grades, the system
is genuinely more continuous and removes many of the
automatic bottlenecks of the old system. The outcome
should be that an official recruited at a low grade in the
new system can, through proven merit, reach a much
higher level of pay and responsibility than under the
old. The knock-on incentives for lifelong learning and
personal development are tangible.
What this radical reform has not done is create a
totally linear system. However great the level of recog-
nised merit by assistants in order to become an admini-
strator, they will need to pass an oral and written exami-
nation; furthermore the number of such progressions is
limited to a maximum of 20% of newly appointed AD
officials each year. For one official this bottleneck was
“important so as not to create the impression that aca-
demic education has no significance anymore”. For the
less conservative, including VP Kinnock, there appear
regrets that the system was not fully linear:
“I would have made the system fully linear top to
bottom, instead of having this linear-ish half and
half system, which represents a massive stride
forward. But I would have liked the job completed.
Why couldn't we have a fully linear system? Because
of the innate and immovable conservatism of the
system, that isn't an excuse it's a reason. That meant
they could not envisage the idea that someone could
come in at 21 as a secretary and by the age of 47 be
a director. There is absolutely no reason in the
world logically why that couldn't happen, with
someone that is very diligent, immensely hard
working, prepared to qualify with an external degree
…I just wanted a system that could accommodate
that for reasons of institutionality.”
Rewarded on Merit – pay under the new system
The new career system does, however, concretely reward
merit through the new pay system. The New Pay Structure
(Table 1) represents not just a simplified linear pay scale
compared to the old structure (Table 2), but creates
financial incentives for excellent performance ahead of
time served. At no stage under the new system is an
individual paid less after being promoted, as the highest
step (5) of any grade is paid no more than the first step
of the next highest grade. Under the old system it was
different – for example an A6 official on step 4 of
seniority in that grade received more than an official at
step 1 of the higher grade A5. By step 8 of this scale the
differences were even more extreme – a C3 official in
step 8 would actually earn more than an official starting
at C1, two grades his senior.
The clear incentive of the new pay structure is to gain
promotion, and to be promoted as rapidly as possible
given that the earlier you are promoted the greater your
pay rise. As such the new system encourages better
performance and aligns pay rewards with the prestige
and demands of higher grades. A clear stride forward.
In the negotiations building up to May 19th 2003
General Affairs Council, where political agreement for
reform of the Staff Regulations was agreed, much focus
was devoted to rewards, but the pay system was not the
most controversial. Perhaps partly because those holding
the purse strings in the Council would not want to
oppose a system that encouraged a better performing
European Civil Service. The issues that proved more
high-profile and controversial were reform of “the
Method”3 and especially reform of pensions. In the
context of the need for reform of many Member States’
pension regimes, it was unsurprising that several
Member States wished to see some equivalent movement
from the European Civil Service’s pension system –
they after all provided two-thirds of the funding for this.
Whilst these decisions may have grabbed the headlines,
beyond perhaps encouraging so-called active ageing,
the concessions were more about achieving political
agreement than any fundamental modernisation of the
Staff Regulations.
A New system of appraisal
Central to a career system that rewards demonstrated
merit is an objective appraisal system. Without a fair and
respected method for appraising performance the
progress in reforming the career system would be
undermined. Yet the existing system needed to be
improved to achieve this. One official characterised the
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prevailing reality:
“We are in a world where you are all permanent
officials, since you can't fire people. In the old
system you just sat there and didn't work anymore,
which is bad because work is put on the high
performers whilst the others are sitting there. When
it came to appraisal there was normally no real
differentiation.”
The new staff appraisal system, known as the Career
Development Review (CDR), sets to change this culture
and provide proper appraisal. A starting point for this is
the introduction of job descriptions for everyone –
many officials simply did not have one under the old
system. Under the CDR, each individual is assessed
against 3 criteria: performance relative to objectives;
demonstration of abilities; and conduct. Each year, after
a full reporting process involving performance review
discussions, a number of merit points (up to a total of 20)
are awarded to each member of staff. These points
accumulate over time and when a certain threshold is
reached, promotion is secured. The process also identifies
agreed objectives and training needs for the coming
year. A target average of 14/20 is set for each Directorate
General (DG) so as to ensure consistency between DGs;
this should also avoid automatic “merit point inflation”
(where everyone is given high marks) as high scores will
need to be offset by low scores.
The CDR sets out an improved process for dealing
with inadequate performance. The new system’s appli-
cation is actually outside the Staff Regulations and has
not yet been finalised. It is likely to provide a support
system to allow re-training, alternative posts and other
support to those staff identified as underperforming.
The ambition at a political level is to replace “the
Byzantine old system” of dealing with incompetence,
which placed such enormous burdens on managers
that only one member of staff has ever been formally
sacked by the Commission for poor performance – on
that occasion it took over 9 years to end legal debate
which went all the way to the European Court of
Justice, and where both sides were funded by the
European Union.
On paper the CDR process should be commended
as a clear improvement – formal reporting structures
ensure real engagement on the management chain;
objectives and performance can more objectively and
clearly measured; and the early identification of
inadequate performance is supported. It is perhaps
questionable that all DGs should have the same target
average for merit points – it is not improbable that some
DGs (e.g. DG Relex) may be perceived as more glamorous
and therefore attract greater competition for posts and
higher quality staff than some other DGs, yet the total
number of points distributed cannot be systematically
higher. But whether it is a success in reality will not be
clear for at least a decade. The introduction of the
performance review system will challenge the
Commission’s internal culture and successful cultural
change will be a long-term process.
A major challenge for the Commission will be
entrenching a culture of promotion based on merit
whilst the nationality of senior officials remains both a
politically important issue and an explicit factor in
senior personnel decisions. Whilst, it is true that no
geographical quotas exist, geographical balance is
important and high-level political lobbying from
Member States is far from unheard of. More positively,
reform is countering the establishment of national
fiefdoms, as staff can normally only be in a post for a
maximum of 5 years. But so long as Member States view
senior posts in the Commission as advantageous, fully
embedding a meritocratic system both in perception
and reality will be troublesome.
Table 1: The New Pay Structure (euros per month)
Grade Step
1 2 3 4 5
16 13 917.93 14 502.78 15 112.21
15 12 301.13 12 818.04 13 356.67 13 728.27 13 917.93
14 10 872.14 11 329.00 11 805.06 12 133.50 12 301.13
13 9 609.16 10 012.95 10 433.70 10 723.99 10 872.14
12 8 492.89 8 849.77 9 221.65 9 478.21 9 609.16
11 7 506.29 7 821.72 8 150.40 8 377.16 8 492.89
10 6 634.31 6 913.09 7 203.59 7 404.01 7 506.29
9 5 863.62 6 110.02 6 366.77 6 543.90 6 634.31
8 5 182.46 5 400.24 5 627.16 5 783.72 5 863.62
7 4 580.43 4 772.91 4 973.47 5 111.84 5 182.46
6 4 048.34 4 218.45 4 395.72 4 518.01 4 580.43
5 3 578.05 3 728.41 3 885.08 3 993.17 4 048.34
4 3 162.40 3 295.29 3 433.76 3 529.29 3 578.05
3 2 795.03 2 912.48 3 034.87 3 119.31 3 162.40
2 2 470.34 2 574.15 2 682.32 2 756.95 2 795.03
1 2 183.37 2 275.12 2 370.72 2 436.68 2 470.34
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A Modern employer
One of the main goals of Neil Kinnock’s reform of the
Staff Regulations is to drag the Commission into the
21st Century by turning the Institution into a truly
modern employer. Due to historical inertia surrounding
personnel reform in the Commission little regard had
been paid previously to the need to reflect contemporary
expectations – and even morals – in the HR policy. The
Commission was not seen as particularly supportive of
‘family-friendly’ working practices and incentives, for
example. Neither was it considered to have a clear and
transparent whistle-blowing policy, as the deficiencies
of the handling of Schmidt-Brown, Andreasen and Van
Buitenen’s cases tended to highlight, if only in the eyes
of the media. It was a startling contradiction that the
Commission appeared not to want to take it’s own
medicine that it was happy to dole out to Member States,
particularly in terms of equality policy – an unconscious
double standard, it seemed to observers. As such, the
Commission decided to drive forward a policy position
heavily based on the principle of explicitly stated rights
and responsibilities for employees. Such modernisation
was seen as an essential requirement to ensure that the
highest calibre of staff could continue to be recruited
and retained. Although the Staff Regulations were
negotiated as a package during the rounds of Group
Statut, Coreper, and the General Affairs Council, these
parts of the package generally faced relatively little
resistance or opposition, and were some of the quickest
areas on which consensus was achieved (with some very
specific exemptions mentioned below). The same can
be said of their discussion in the reports so far of the
European Parliament, thus indicating a broad welcoming
of the principle of this modernisation of employment
protections and obligations.
Here we discuss in further detail the three major
elements that make up the ‘modern employer’ provisions
of the revised Staff Regulations: whistle-blowing; family-
friendly policies and allowances and equal opportunities
policy.
Whistle-blowing: Protecting the official
and the institution
An example of a policy that sits squarely under the
‘rights and responsibilities’ banner is that of whistle-
blowing, where procedures were previously put in place
in the Staff Regulations to allow officials of the Com-
mission to raise serious matters of wrong-doing through
defined channels, for their own protection and that of the
Institution. Whilst many closely involved in this area
within the Commission felt that the provisions on whistle-
blowing in the Staff Regulations were well set out, it
became apparent that many outside those circles did not
have a grasp of the rules. This has led to a number of high
profile cases – both of people who could easily be
defined as whistle-blowers and so-called non-whistle-
blowers – taking an explosive and unconventional
course, often played out in full view of the world’s
media. Despite many of those involved in these high
profile cases not being defined strictly as whistle-blowers
(i.e. not raising concerns through official channels),
there was a recognised ambiguity in the system. The
Commission therefore laid out a number of revisions to
the provisions on whistle-blowing, aimed at giving
more and fully transparent lines of complaint to people
raising concerns, and at the same time specifying the
sanctions for those who damage the Commission by not
following agreed procedures.
Whistle-blowing, according to one official, was one
of the areas of ‘modern employer’ policy that saw the
Table 2: The Old Pay Structure (figures from 2001 presentation)
STEPS/ECHELONS
Grades 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
A1 11492,16 12102,64 12713,12 13323,60 13934,08 14544,56
A2 10198,34 10780,87 11363,40 11945,93 12528,46 13110,99
A3 8446,08 8955,63 9465,18 9974,73 10484,28 10993,83 11503,38 12012,93
A4 7095,60 7493,32 7891,04 8288,76 8686,48 9084,20 9481,92 9879,64
CAT. A A5 5849,97 6196,54 6543,11 6889,68 7236,25 7582,82 7929,39 8275,96
A6 5055,47 5331,30 5607,13 5882,96 6158,79 6434,62 6710,45 6986,28
A7 4351,74 4568,27 4784,80 5001,33 5217,86 5434,39
A8 3848,72 4003,93
B1 5055,47 5331,30 5607,13 5882,96 6158,79 6434,62 6710,45 6986,28
B2 4380,18 4585,53 4790,88 4996,23 5201,58 5406,93 5612,28 5817,63
CAT. B B3 3674,05 3844,80 4015,55 4186,30 4357,05 4527,80 4698,55 4869,30
B4 3177,73 3325,81 3473,89 3621,97 3770,05 3918,13 4066,21 4214,29
B5 2840,47 2960,30 3080,13 3199,96
C1 3241,15 3371,85 3502,55 3633,25 3763,95 3894,65 4025,35 4156,05
C2 2819,12 2938,89 3058,66 3178,43 3298,20 3417,97 3537,74 3657,51
CAT . C C3 2629,71 2732,33 2834,95 2937,57 3040,19 3142,81 3245,43 3348,05
C4 2376,14 2472,39 2568,64 2664,89 2761,14 2857,39 2953,64 3049,89
C5 2190,95 2280,73 2370,51 2460,29
D1 2476,10 2584,37 2692,64 2800,91 2909,18 3017,45 3125,72 3233,99
CAT. D D2 2257,73 2353,89 2450,05 2546,21 2642,37 2738,53 2834,69 2930,85
D3 2101,35 2191,29 2281,23 2371,17 2461,11 2551,05 2640,99 2730,93
D4 1981,29 2062,54 2143,79 2225,04
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most movement and negotiation at Group Statut level.
Each Member State administration brought to the table
their own codes on whistle-blowing, and these varied
from total and unfiltered disclosure – including to the
media – in some Nordic countries to more conservative
approaches in southern Member States. Under the
existing Regulations staff are allowed to report concerns
to OLAF, the independent anti-fraud body, or to their
own hierarchies, up to the level of Secretary General.
The new proposal includes an option for staff to report
concerns also to the President of other Institutions, such
as the Court of Auditors, the European Parliament and
the Council, or to the Ombudsman, if OLAF or the
hierarchy fail to take appropriate action in a reasonable
amount of time. This will effectively allow officials
additional channels and a second bite at the cherry if
they are concerned about how their complaint is being
dealt with. Political actors have been keen to provide a
channel for whistle-blowing which provides all involved
with total security – both in terms of the employment
status of the individual and for the Institution against
unauthorised disclosure or false allegation – yet to also
maintain a spirit of healthy and active debate about
policies and procedures.
Family-friendly policies and allowances:
An emphasis on supporting the family unit
The second major plank of the ‘modern employer’
policy is that focussing on family-friendly work practices
and allowances that are aimed at reflecting the moral and
social climate of modern-day European societies. The
original Staff Regulations had been drafted at a time
when single-income families were the norm and the
importance of work-life balance had not been recognised.
With an increasingly diverse workforce the Commission
needed to catch-up with practices that had already
become well-established in many Member States, parti-
cularly those of part-time working and job-sharing. The
revised Staff Regulations propose new rights for staff to
work part-time if they have children under the age of
nine or if they have responsibilities caring for a sick or
disabled dependent. Officials will also have the right to
work reduced hours (minimum 80 per cent) if they have
children between nine and twelve years of age. For those
aged between 55 and 60 the right to work part-time will
be awarded regardless of dependants. Officials choosing
to work part-time will also be able to opt to keep their
full-time pension contributions, although this will not
be an option for job-sharers. Previously any staff member
would only be granted half-time rights in exceptional
circumstances, and only after an official application in
writing had been submitted.
Long-overdue catching up was also required in the
area of maternity and paternity leave. Whilst many
Member States had long since introduced generous
maternity leave and pay and some paternity leave, the
Commission had what could be described as only basic
provision for its officials. Under the new Staff Regulations
maternity leave on full pay will be increased from 16 to
20 weeks, with an increase to 24 weeks in the case of
multiple or premature births. Paternity leave will be
increased to 10 days and adoptive leave of up to 20
weeks will be granted to staff with newly adopted
children. Where the Commission attempted to go much
further than many Member States is on the issue of
parental leave, with the introduction of a total of six
months’ partially paid leave during the first twelve years
of childhood. Officials will receive a basic monthly
allowance of EUR 1000 during the first three months
and for the remaining three months they will receive
EUR 750 plus social security, plus acquired non-
contributory pension rights. Parents will also be able to
opt for part-time working on this basis for twelve months,
whereby the allowance is, of course, halved. Other forms
of leave will also be introduced or extended in scope. For
example, officials will be able to take up to nine months
compassionate leave to look after sick relatives, under
a similar allowances and social security system to that
of parental leave. Special leave of up to five days to care
for a seriously ill child will also be available, formalising
what has previously been an informal entitlement in
many parts of the Commission.
The allowance system, although not explicitly a
function of family-friendly policy, can be mentioned in
this context as the politically agreed reform of allowances
does emphasise the role of the family. The allowances
regime was debated at the political level (in Group
Statut, Coreper and GAC levels) as part of the overall
remuneration package, including the pensions regime
and linearisation of the career structure (discussed in
The Career deal, pay, promotion & appraisal). As such
the great victory for the Commission was the retention
of the expatriation allowance for officials (unchanged
at 16 per cent). However, the decision to increase the
dependent child allowance from EUR 237.38 to
EUR 312.64 over a period of six years, together with the
introduction of a pre-school allowance of EUR 76.37
per child and the reimbursement of school fees and
transport costs, mark a shift towards supporting the
family unit through the allowances system.
Equal opportunities policy: A step change in gender
and sex-equality rights for officials
Some of the most progressive step changes in the proposed
Staff Regulations in terms of becoming a modern
employer concern an emboldening of the already well-
established equal opportunity provisions. As with the
whistle-blowing policy referred to above, the revised
harassment policy that was agreed at the political level
in May 2003 aims to protect the interests of staff with
concerns about the way business is conducted in the
Commission. The principles surrounding protection
against harassment have long been in operation within
the Commission; however, it was thought that by incor-
porating them into the Staff Regulations they would be
given a firmer legal footing. Psychological and sexual
harassment will now be defined and concomitantly
prohibited by the revised Staff Regulations. Sexual
harassment will be considered a form of discrimination
– gender discrimination – and as such will come under
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revised proposals to reverse the burden of proof (placing
it on the employer) in cases of alleged discrimination.
This burden of proof reversal will also apply more
widely to any implementing aspect of the Staff Regu-
lations. So, for example, if an employee were of the
opinion that they had been passed over for promotion
because of their gender the burden would fall on the
employer to prove that there had been no breach of equal
treatment provisions. This is consistent with practice in
some Member States and much of the USA, but can still
be considered a bold, pro-active move.
Perhaps the most striking and one of the more
controversial proposed changes to the Staff Regulations
is the suggestion that same-sex partnerships that do not
have access to legal marriage in their respective Member
States will be treated as if they were married couples.
These couples will, therefore, have access to the same
benefits and social security as married couples. This
subject was hotly debated at Group Statut level, with
opinion divided broadly along lines consistent with the
religious make-up of various Member States, but with
objections also being raised on a practical level by
traditionally liberal Member States. How, for example,
will non-marital couples be able to register their
partnership if not at their Member State level? Will there
be a qualifying period or other criteria? These any many
other issues will be fleshed out when drafting the legal
translation, and will involve negotiation with union
representatives, the European Parliament and, ultima-
tely, a second sign-off from the Council.
Internal motivation versus external triggers:
what drove the reform of the Staff Regulations?
The course of events prior to the fall of the Santer
Commission can arguably be characterised as an internal
process of evolution of the need to reform the human
resources policy of the European Commission. By the late
1990s the Commission as an organisation had grown into
an unwieldy management system, with poorly defined –
and motivated – career progression. The Staff Regulations,
designed to govern, guide and protect a relatively small
set of civil servants, were now somewhat depassé, failing
to take into account the more complex management
structures and, indeed, the social, ethical and moral
requirements of the modern-day Commission. The
Commission had been producing high quality policy for
decades – groundbreaking work on Economic and
Monetary Union, for example – but the organisation was
highly functioning in spite of its structure, rather than
because of it. It would be hyperbolic to portray the
Institution as dysfunctional, but it was clear that success-
ful policy tended to emerge from informal channels rather
than due to any clear priority setting and management.
Management itself was not regarded as an essential skill
at that time, and training had no premium. What was
needed was a change of culture, and it was believed that
the only way to effect this cultural change was to initiate
a structural, systemic change. With enlargement looming
large around the corner the imperative for reform was clear.
The fall of the Santer Commission can be charac-
terised as an external trigger which instilled a greater
sense of urgency in the newly blooming reform. Without
the fall of the Commission the speed and the intensity
of the reform effort would not have been so great,
according to some officials’ views. What the events of
1999 did was provide a mandate for root and branch
reform, rather that piecemeal change, and this was made
evident in the appointment of a Vice-President for
reform, Neil Kinnock. Outside interest in the workings
of the Commission was indeed stirred by the internal
deficiencies of the last Commission's outdated customs,
or “barnacles” as one Commissioner described them.
However, the importance of this trigger should not be
overplayed. Both at the official and political level
opinion is firmly grounded in the fact that the motivation
for reform (both of the Staff Regulations and more
widely) was primarily internally generated and driven.
As one political figure described it: “It was not a matter
of clean-up - it was a matter of catch-up; the Commission
is not fundamentally a dirty place.” Moreover, it is
widely believed within the Commission that had the
events of 1999 not taken place the need for reform would
have been just as acute, but instead with Member States
taking the lead in calling for action. In sum, it could be
argued that a groundswell of internal motivation was
triggered and intensified by the fall of the Santer
Commission and all that entailed.
Conclusions
Once finally agreed and fully implemented, the reform
of the staff regulations should make the Commission
both a better place to work and a more modern, efficient
organisation. It can provide staff with more appropriate
incentives to perform well both through a new system of
rewards and the support of a more understanding “modern
employer”. These reforms will benefit the institution
and, without meaning to being glib, the Member States
and citizens of the European Union. More concretely
the entire reform has been achieved at a net cost saving
in excess of 1 billion Euros. This was both an impressive
effort by the reformers, but one driven by the political
necessity of successfully getting the agreement through
the Council.
Current perceptions of winners and losers of the
reform may be driven by the negotiations up to the May
2003 GAC. As discussed previously, the pensions
question was inevitably raised in this political nego-
tiation. Yes, the Council secured some financial conces-
sions, but on balance the staff, including future staff to
be recruited under the new system, will benefit greatly
from the reform package. The pensions issue prompted
what were relatively poorly attended strikes and in truth
the Unions remained peripheral to the negotiating process
– one official speculated that they were expecting to be
asked to step in and negotiate directly with the Council
as was witnessed during the Delors Commission, when
the method was secured. If so, that was hopelessly naive.
Could the reform have gone further?
That the reform of the Staff Regulations will make the
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Commission more modern and efficient is difficult to
dispute, the toughest question is whether it should have
gone further? The most obvious area is not establishing
a fully linear Career, as well as pay, structure and this is
regretted by Vice President Kinnock. Were the Com-
mission right to keep the elitist Concours admission
system? The conclusion at official level was that if “it
ain’t broke don’t fix it” and moreover the recruitment
system was perceived as promoting high standards. The
more radical alternative of a promotion to post system
was considered by officials, but was thought to require
a very reliable system for getting jobs and perhaps is not
have been consistent with the challenges of the Com-
mission’s unique multi-cultural environment. The
continuation of the expatriation allowance in a modern,
global workplace has also to be questioned. The potential
list of missed opportunities goes on.
It is crucial to remember, as any reformer will relate,
including those at an official and political level in the
Commission, that reform is not an event it is a process.
And whilst it is only sensible that an organisation that
has gone through a serious period of introspection and
reform is careful not to get too self-obsessed, it is most
likely that the process of modernisation is a continuing
phenomenon.
________________
NOTES
* Editors’ Note: Mr N. Kinnock has been awarded EIPA’s
Alexis de Tocqueville Prize 2003, which will be presented
to him on 11 December 2003 in Maastricht, see pp. 43-44.
** Editors’ Note: Mr Henning Christophersen is the Chairman
of EIPA’s Board of Governors.
1 The Commission has decided to stick with one element of this
approach, the Concours system, and rightly argues that a
system ensuring high quality of recruitment can only be to the
benefit of the organisation.
2
“An Administration at the Service of half a billion Europeans”
3 Since 1981 the salaries of EU officials have been adjusted
annually in line with changes in the purchasing power of
remuneration of the Member States’ public services in
accordance with a legally binding formula which is known
as the ‘Method’. As part of the agreement it is to be legally
incorporated into the new staff regulations. 
Professor Geert BOUCKAERT
EIPA’s Alexis de Tocqueville Prize 2003 has been awarded to Rt. Hon. Neil
KINNOCK, Vice-President of the European Commission and Prof. Geert
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of Leuven. The award ceremony will be held in Maastricht on 11 December 2003.
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